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TALENT CAN’T BE ALLOCATED: A LABOR
ECONOMICS JUSTIFICATION FOR NOPOACHING AGREEMENT CRIMINALITY IN
ANTITRUST REGULATION
Rochella T. Davis *
ABSTRACT
As of late, labor markets have been a focal point in antitrust enforcement.
In 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it will pursue nopoaching agreements criminally—an unprecedented policy. More recently,
in January 2018, the DOJ’s Attorney General indicated that the agency is
following through on the policy. This Article argues that the DOJ’s new
policy is logical and prudent because the economic effects that no-poaching
agreements have on labor markets mirror the anticompetitive effects of
customer allocation agreements. It also shows that the policy is wellsupported by labor economics and antitrust policies. In efforts to comply with
the DOJ’s policy, employers and their counsels should continue
collaborations to ensure that their human resource practices comply with
antitrust laws.
INTRODUCTION
Business professionals and scholars recognize that employees can be,
and often are, a company’s greatest asset. 1 This is especially true when it
* Appellate Law Clerk to Chief Justice Rhys S. Hodge, Supreme Court of the U.S. Virgin
Islands; J.D., Trial and Appellate Advocacy Concentration, with distinction, Suffolk
University Law School; B.A., summa cum laude, University of the Virgin Islands. Many
thanks to Professor Jeffrey M. Lipshaw for reviewing drafts of this Article at its inception and
suggesting its title; Orly Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of San Diego, for inspiring
the title through her book, Talent Wants to Be Free, and allowing me to use the inspired title;
the editorial board and members of the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and
Commercial Law; and my family and friends for their unwavering support. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect those of Chief Justice Hodge, the
Supreme Court of the U.S. Virgin Islands, or the U.S. Virgin Islands judiciary.
1. See Iveta Gabčanová, The Employees – The Most Important Asset in The Organizations, 5

HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. & ERGONOMICS 1 (2011), https://frcatel.fri.uniza.sk/hrme/files/2011/20
11_1_03.pdf (“Whether it is called people, labor, intellectual capital, human capital, human
resources, talent, or some other term, the resource that lies within employees and how they are
organized is increasingly recognized as critical to strategic success and competitive advantage.”)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Former CEO and chairperson of Xerox
Corporation, Anne M. Mulchay, once said:
Employees are a company’s greatest asset—they’re your competitive advantage . . . . You
want to attract and retain the best; provide them with encouragement, stimulus, and make
them feel that they are an integral part of the company’s mission. Employees who believe
that management is concerned about them as a whole person—not just an employee—
are more productive, more satisfied, more fulfilled. Satisfied employees mean satisfied
customers, which leads to profitability[.]

280

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 12

comes to top performers, highly skilled employees, and innovative
employees in modern technology-based businesses. 2 When workforces
increase and there are low-cost opportunities for mobility—as, for example,
in concentrated technology centers, like Boston or Silicon Valley—employee
retention methods become increasingly important for employers.3
Understandably, after investing in their employees’ skills and growth, it is
difficult for employers to witness their employees’ departure, especially if
those employees move on to a competitor. 4 There are a few ways employers
can increase employee retention, including enforceable non-compete
agreements and “long-term compensation.” 5
LifeCare, Inc. Conference Features Xerox CEO Anne Mulcahy; Employers Challenged to Motivate
and Engage Workforce, BUSINESS WIRE (May 16, 2003, 1:01 PM) (internal quotation marks
omitted),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20030516005369/en/LifeCare-ConferenceFeatures-Xerox-CEO-Anne-Mulcahy.
2. See More Employers Finding It Difficult to Recruit for Highly Skilled Jobs, SHRM Survey
Shows, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.shrm.org/about-shrm/pr
ess-room/pressreleases/pages/moreemployersfindingitdifficulttorecruitforhighlyskilledjobs,shrmsurveyshows.asp
x (mentioning survey findings show “the most difficult positions to fill are highly skilled positions
such as scientists, engineers, high-skilled technical (technicians and programmers) and high-skilled
medical (nurses, doctors, specialists) [and] [s]ixty-six percent of respondents reported difficulty in
hiring, an increase from 52 percent in 2011”).
3. See John Dodge, The War for Tech Talent Escalates, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 19, 2016),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/02/19/the-war-for-tech-talentescalates/ejUSbuPCjPLCMRYlRZIKoJ/story.html (describing the ease with which high-skilled
employees can move to another company). “Once [software developers begin a job], they can get
as many as 20 recruiting calls a day trying to convince them to leave for another company. And
when they do, a 20 percent to 25 percent bump in salary is not unusual.” Id.
4. See id. (stating Massachusetts technology executives describe the hiring environment for
skilled technology employees as “brutal”).
5. For the usual elements of an enforceable non-compete agreement, see Viad Corp. v. Cordial,
299 F. Supp. 2d 466, 477 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
[T]o be enforceable under Pennsylvania law, a covenant not to compete must be: (1)
ancillary to an employment contract or to a contract for the sale of goodwill or other
subject property, (2) supported by adequate consideration, (3) reasonably necessary to
protect legitimate interests of the purchaser and (4) reasonably limited in duration and
geographic extent.
Id. See also Campbell Soup Co. v. Desatnick, 58 F. Supp. 2d 477, 488–89 (D.N.J. 1999).
Under New Jersey law, an agreement restricting an employee’s ability to compete with
his employer after the termination of his employment will generally be found to be
reasonable and, therefore, enforceable where it simply protects the legitimate interests of
the employer, imposes no undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the
public.
Id. (internal quotations omitted). While states that allow the agreements vary on diction in setting
forth the elements, the overall characteristic an enforceable non-compete agreement should have is
reasonableness. See Viad Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d at 477; see also Campbell Soup Co., 58 F. Supp.
2d at 488–89. For an explanation of long-term compensation packages, see MODERN CORPORATION
CHECKLISTS § 17:8 (2017), Westlaw MCORPCHK. Also referred to as “long term incentive plans,”
long-term compensation plans include stock options and retirement plans. See id. (mentioning
investment plans and appreciation plans are examples of long-term compensation); Long Term
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Another method, and the one I will assess in this Article, circumvents
employees entirely. 6 Namely, “no-poaching agreements,” which employers
use to combat employee migration without the financial cost of incentive pay
or the possible reputational cost of enforceable non-compete agreements. 7
Commonly called “no-hire agreements,” “no-switching agreements,” or “no
cold call agreements,” no-poaching agreements are agreements between
employers to refrain from hiring each other’s employees. 8 These agreements
may be express or implied, written or oral, and are most common among
business competitors. 9 Unsurprisingly, there is a certain furtiveness that
comes with these agreements. 10 For example, in In re High Tech Employee
Antitrust Litigation, 11 the agreement was a quiet “handshake agreement”
among competing Silicon Valley technology companies including Adobe,
Apple, Google, Intel, and Pixar. 12
Pursuant to a department policy, the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) reserves criminal antitrust prosecutions for horizontal, per se
Incentive Plan – LTIP, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/long_term_incentiveplan.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2017) (referring to long-term compensation as long-term incentive
plans and explaining retirement plans are one type of them).
6. See, e.g., Consolidated Amended Complaint at 11, In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig.,
856 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 11–CV–02509–LHK) [hereinafter Amended
Complaint] (describing a no-poaching agreement among technology companies).
7. Id. In High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, the no-poaching agreement between Pixar
and Lucasfilm consisted of the following terms:
59. First, each agreed not to cold call each other’s employees.
60. Second, each agreed to notify the other company when making an offer to an
employee of the other company, if that employee applied for a job notwithstanding the
absence of cold calling.
61. Third, each agreed that if either made an offer to such an employee of the other
company, neither company would counteroffer above the initial offer. This third
agreement was created with the intent and effect of eliminating “bidding wars,” whereby
an employee could use multiple rounds of bidding between Pixar and Lucasfilm to
increase her total compensation.
Id.

8. See Michael Lindsay, Jaime Stilson & Rebecca Bernhard, Employers Beware: The DOT and
FTC Confirm That Naked Wage-Fixing and “No-Poaching” Agreements Are Per Se Antitrust
Violations, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2016, at 12, n.2 (“No-poaching agreements are also called
no-hire, no-interference, non-solicitation, or no-switching agreements, depending on the
circumstances.”).
9. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939) (finding an agreement
existed among coconspirators from inferences drawn from their acts). Express agreements may
come from circumstantial evidence. See id.
10. See, e.g., In re Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1209–10 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (noting that the agreements between the companies were expressed orally).
11. Amended Complaint, supra note 6.
12. See Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlements with Adobe,
Apple, Google, & Intel (No. 11-CV-02509-LHK), 2014 WL 3917126, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8,
2014) [hereinafter Order Denying Approval of Settlements] (“Otellini stated in an email to another
Intel executive regarding the Google–Intel agreement: ‘Let me clarify. We have nothing signed. We
have a handshake ‘no recruit’ between [E]ric and myself. I would not like this broadly known.’”).
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agreements, like price-fixing agreements, market allocation agreements, and
bid-rigging agreements. 13 Because the effects of these agreements are so
harmful to competition, for more than a century, evidence of such agreements
has been sufficient to establish a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 14
Hence, it is alarming to the DOJ and antitrust experts alike when employers
competing for employees in labor markets agree not to compete for each
other’s employees. 15
Due to the uproar anti-poaching agreements have caused in some labor
markets, such as the technology and healthcare markets, the DOJ and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced in October 2016, that “[g]oing
forward, the DOJ intends to proceed criminally against naked . . . nopoaching agreements,” recognizing the seriousness of labor antitrust
violations. 16 As a result, the DOJ has been actively reviewing potential per
se anti-poaching violations; recently, at a conference hosted by the Antitrust
Research Foundation on January 19, 2018, the DOJ’s Assistant Attorney
General, Makan Delrahim, noted that prosecutions adhering to the policy will

13. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL III-12 (5th ed.
Apr. 2015) https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761166/download [hereinafter ANTITRUST DIVISION
MANUAL] (“In general, current Division policy is to proceed by criminal investigation and
prosecution in cases involving horizontal, per se unlawful agreements such as price fixing, bid
rigging, and customer and territorial allocations.”). “Generally, the type of conduct will govern the
civil/criminal determination (e.g., merger matters are pursued civilly, per se price fixing is pursued
criminally).” Id. at III-7.
14. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1381 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (providing a brief
explanation of the per se rule). The court explained:
Courts impose . . . presumptions [of anticompetitive effect] where (1) they have had
sufficient prior experience with a type of action to feel justified in concluding that
previously discerned anticompetitive effects will always or nearly always be present once
the existence of a practice is shown or (2) even without that actual experience the court
reaches the same conclusion through analysis.
Id.

15. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE
FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 3 (Oct. 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/do
wnload [hereinafter HR GUIDANCE] (condemning naked anti-poaching agreements); see also Nick

Grimmer, How To (Legally) Keep Competitors From Poaching Your Key Employees: Antitrust Law
And Non-Poaching/Non-Solicitation Agreements, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMORY (Aug. 16, 2013),
http://www.antitrustalert.com/2013/08/articles/joint-venturescompetitor-collaboration/how-tolegally-keep-competitors-from-poaching-your-key-employees-antitrust-law-and-nonpoachingnon-solicitation-agreements/ (expressing no-poaching agreements are “likely per se
illegal”).
16. HR GUIDANCE, supra note 15 at 3–4 (providing antitrust guidance to human resources
professionals and announcing that no-poaching agreements will be prosecuted criminally). The
announcement mentioned a few cases in which the DOJ has addressed labor antitrust violations. For
example, it mentions U.S. v. Arizona Hospital, in which hospitals in Arizona established a scheme
to fix the wages of their temporary and per diem nurses. See United States v. Ariz. Hosp. &
Healthcare Ass’n, Case No. CV07-1030-PHX (D. Ariz. May 22, 2007), available at http://www.us
doj.gov/atr/cases/f223400/223477.htm.
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soon come to fruition. 17 Though the DOJ has argued that these agreements
are per se violations prior to the announcement, they pursued the agreements
via civil prosecution only. 18 Considering this policy statement and
Delrahim’s announcement, it is imperative that companies and their human
resource and corporate professionals carefully tailor any anti-poaching
agreements they choose to enter. 19 In doing so, companies’ officials,
especially their human resource professionals, must have a good grasp of
antitrust analyses and implications. 20
This Article intends to show that labor economics strongly supports the
DOJ’s new policy of pursuing anti-poaching agreements criminally.
Specifically, it will show that the economic effects that no-poaching
agreements have on labor markets are undoubtedly analogous to the
recognized effects that market allocation agreements have on economic
markets—which has supported the per se condemnation of market allocations
17. See Eleanor Tyler, Justice Dept. Is Going After ‘No-Poach’ Agreements, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.bna.com/justice-dept-going-n73014474358/.
“We’ve been very active” in reviewing potential violations of the antitrust law that take
the form of agreements not to compete for workers, said Makan Delrahim, the DOJ’s
assistant attorney general for the antitrust division, at a conference sponsored by the
Antitrust Research Foundation at George Mason University in Virginia.
Id.; Dee Bansal, Howard Morse & Jacqueline Grise, 10 Antitrust Developments and Trends to
Watch in 2018, LAW360 (Jan. 24, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://www.cooley.com/~/media/cooley/pdf/re
prints/2018/2018-01-29-10-antitrust-developments-and-trends-to-watch-in-2018.ashx?la=en
(“Based on Delrahim’s comments, criminal prosecutions are on the horizon.”); Timothy F. Haley
& Ashley K. Laken, DOJ To Announce Criminal Enforcement Actions For “No-Poach”
Agreements, SEYFARTH SHAW (Jan. 25, 2018), http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/MA012518LE (“Criminal prosecution of ‘no-poaching/no-hire’ agreements appears imminent.”).
18. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Motion for Application of the Per Se Standard, In re High-Tech
Employee Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 11-CV-2509-LHK)
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Motion for Application].
19. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 15 (mentioning scenarios in which no-poaching agreements
may serve a legitimate purpose).
20. See New Guidance for Human Resource Professionals to Avoid Antitrust Violations,
TANNENBAUM HELPERN SYRACUSE & HIRSCHTRITT LLP (2016), http://www.thsh.com/documents
/December_2016/New-Guidance-for-Human-Resource.pdf (warning employers to be cautious
about entering agreements with competitors regarding employment). The law firm states:
In light of this new guidance, employers must be sure HR professionals are kept abreast
of antitrust compliance issues and receive necessary training. Employers must ensure HR
and other personnel are cautious in their communications with competitors and avoid
agreeing to any arrangements that restrict competition on terms of employment or
provide for the exchange of competitively sensitive information. In particular, employers
must not enter into naked no-poaching or wage-fixing agreements that could subject the
employer and culpable individuals to criminal liability.
Id.; Christopher H. Wood, U.S. Antitrust Authorities Now Characterize Employee Wage-Fixing &
No-Poaching Agreements Between Competitors as Criminal Behavior, MONDAQ, http://lewisbrisbo
is.com/newsroom/legal-alerts/u.s.-antitrust-authorities-now-characterize-employee-wage-fixingno-poaching-agreements-between-co?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_ca
mpaign=View-Original (last updated Nov. 9, 2016) (cautioning employers about the DOJ’s HR
Guidance).
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for centuries. Part I of this Article will provide a historical explanation of
antitrust development in labor markets. Part II will then discuss one per se
violation—horizontal market allocations (i.e., customer allocation). Part III
will identify anti-poaching agreements that are squarely per se violations,
running the risk of criminal prosecution, and then identify anti-poaching
agreements that courts would likely analyze under the rule of reason, possibly
surviving the analysis. Thereafter, Part IV summarizes the basic economics
of the labor market. Finally, Part V will argue that naked anti-poaching
agreements are akin to horizontal customer allocation agreements and
interfere with competition in the labor market in ways that restrict all
competition (including wage competition), just as market allocation
agreements restrict not only price competition, but all competition.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW AND
THE RECOGNITION OF THE LABOR MARKET AS AN
ANTITRUST MARKET
Antitrust law was designed to create fair market competition for the
benefit of consumers. 21 It promotes consumer choice and price competition. 22
Since the creation of the Sherman Act in 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., Section
1 deemed it illegal for competitors to enter into agreements with each other
that would restrain competition. 23 For example, price-fixing agreements
certainly violate Section 1 because they result in a lack of price competition
among competitors, and consequently, higher prices for consumers. 24 Section
1 provides, in relevant part: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 25 The term
“every” within the statute was initially interpreted based on its plain meaning

21. See About the Division, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION, https://www.justice.g
ov/atr/mission (last updated July 20, 2015) (“The goal of the antitrust laws is to protect economic
freedom and opportunity by promoting free and fair competition in the marketplace.”).
22. Thomas B. Leary, The Economic Routes of Antitrust, Outline Prepared for a Presentation at
the International Seminar on Antitrust Law and Economic Development (July 1, 2004) available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/economic-roots-antitrustoutline./040706rootsofantitrust.pdf (“Consumer welfare is defined primarily to mean competitive
prices and freedom of choice . . . .”).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (providing conspiracy to restrain competition is illegal).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (recognizing
that price-fixing agreements have been per se violations since the late 1800s). The Court stated:
[F]or over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to the
principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that
no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were
designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense.
Id.

25. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).
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by the Supreme Court of the United States. 26 Later, Justice William Howard
Taft designed the ancillary restraint doctrine in Addyston Pipe & Steel, which
provides that Section 1 does not prohibit all restraints; rather, it condemns
naked restraints and allows ancillary restraints. 27 Consequently, the Standard
Oil Court—recognizing that only unreasonable restraints on trade are
illegal—announced the rule of reason. 28
After the announcement of the rule of reason, courts generally began to
analyze restraints on trade under either the per se rule or the rule of reason.29
The per se rule is rigid; it presumes that the alleged conduct or agreement is
unreasonable. 30 Courts only apply the per se rule when the effects of a
restraint are “immediately obvious;” the rule is usually applied to agreements
that courts have long known to negatively impact competition in markets,
such as horizontal price-fixing. 31 If a court applies the per se standard, only
26. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897) (opining that
Section 1 should be interpreted literally).
27. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 211 (1899) (affirming the
ancillary restraints doctrine set forth by Justice William Howard Taft’s Sixth Circuit decision);
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as modified, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
[N]o conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is
merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the
covenantee in the full enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him
from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party.
Id.

28. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 41 (1911) (creating the rule of reason
standard); see also Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (articulating how
to perform a rule of reason analysis consisting of market determinations and anticompetitive effect
analyses). Note that before Standard Oil, Justice White, in his Trans-Missouri dissenting opinion,
expressed that only unreasonable restraints violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 327–28 (White, J., dissenting).
29. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1213–16 (2008) (providing a detailed summary of
approaches courts take in analyzing agreements under Section 1). There is also the quick-look
analysis (also referred to as the truncated rule of reason analysis), which courts use when the conduct
is not a per se violation but is so sufficiently anticompetitive that the court can simply take a quick
glance. See California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 757 (1999); see also Lemley & Leslie,
supra, at 1215–16 (discussing the quick-look approach). In California Dental, the Supreme Court
of the United States announced that an “abbreviated or ‘quick-look’ analysis is appropriate when an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements
in question have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.” California Dental Ass’n, 526
U.S. at 757. However, it is still difficult to ascertain when to apply a quick-look analysis. See
Geoffrey D. Oliver, Of Tenors, Real Estate Brokers and Golf Clubs: A Quick Look at Truncated
Rule of Reason Analysis, A.B.A. (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
antitrust_source/oliver_Anti_Spring2010_8.authcheckdam.pdf (explaining that courts apply quicklook inconsistently and are generally unclear regarding when the test should apply).
30. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 65 (ceasing analysis under the rule of reason when
it discovered price-fixing because there is “a conclusive presumption” that price-fixing violates
Section 1).
31. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343–45 (1982) (explaining
the rationale for the per se rule). The Court stated:
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the action or restraint must be proven. 32 Courts need not make any further
inquiry into the restraint’s actual effect on the market (the precise harm) or
business justification because they are already aware of the restraint’s effect
on the economy. 33 Owing to the rigidity of the per se rule, courts are hesitant
to apply the per se rule to new types of agreements and have relieved certain
agreements, such as vertical price restraints, from per se scrutiny. 34
Courts analyze most business conduct and agreements under the rule of
reason. 35 When the anticompetitive effects of the restraint are not
immediately obvious, courts apply the rule of reason. 36 Under the rule of
reason, courts perform a market analysis by looking at the “nature of the
restraint . . . history of the restraint . . . purpose or end sought to be attained,
[and] all relevant facts.” 37 A plaintiff must show that a defendant’s actions
are unreasonably anticompetitive and the defendant has market power. 38 The
defendant can offer business justifications showing that the conduct is
procompetitive or the defendant can offer evidence to show that the restraint
is narrowly tailored to achieve a business purpose. 39 The restraint may be
tailored in scope, duration, and purpose. 40

The costs of judging business practices under the rule of reason . . . have been reduced
by the recognition of per se rules. Once experience with a particular kind of restraint
enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it
has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable. . . . For the sake
of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some
agreements that a fullblown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable.
Id. The policy behind the per standard is to achieve judicial economy. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.; Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (The
per se rule, “treating categories of restraints as necessarily illegal, eliminates the need to study the
reasonableness of an individual restraint in light of the real market forces at work.”).
34. See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., 551 U.S. at 886; State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7
(1997) (holding vertical arrangements to set maximum prices is no longer per se illegal); Maricopa
Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 343–45 (holding setting minimum sale prices vertically is no longer
per se illegal).
35. See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (noting courts apply the
rule of reason “for the majority of anticompetitive practices challenged under [Section] 1”); ROBERT
G. VAN SCHOONENBERG & KAREN E. SILVERMAN, 5 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE
AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 79:34 (2017) (noting that courts analyze most agreements under “the
more forgiving” rule of reason).
36. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1986) (declining to apply
the per se rule because the effects of the restraint were not “immediately obvious”).
37. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 211 (1899) (articulating the ancillary restraint doctrine). The
Addyston Pipe Court made clear that Section 1 does not prohibit ancillary restraints. Id. at 211.
Reasonable agreements created for a legitimate business purpose are ancillary. See id.
38. See Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 236 (applying the rule of reason).
39. Id. at 237–38 (holding an agreement reasonable because it improved the market and limited
operation). The Court considered three factors: nature, scope, and effects, by looking at the specific
business industry, the nature of the restraint, and the history and purpose of the restraint. Id.
40. Id. (discussing the characteristics of an ancillary restraint).
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A. HISTORY OF THE ANALYSIS OF NO-POACHING AGREEMENTS 41
“The market for employee skills is a market subject to the
provisions of the Sherman Act.” 42
It is a longstanding tradition for courts to analyze no-poaching
agreements under antitrust laws. 43 The labor force is, for antitrust purposes,
a market, and no-poaching agreements can restrain or eliminate competition
among employers for talented employees. 44 Throughout antitrust history, nopoaching agreements have been analyzed under the rule of reason.45 For
instance, in Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 46 one of the first cases involving
no-poaching agreements, the court applied the rule of reason.47 Courts have
continued to apply the rule of reason to no-poaching agreements; for instance,
in Eichorn v. AT & T Corp., a 2001 decision, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals applied the rule. 48 However, through a series of prosecutions, the
DOJ has focused on pursuing no-poaching agreements as per se violations,
but the cases to date were settled before a decision could be made on whether

41. For a summary of the examination of no-poaching agreements through other legal avenues,
such as covenants not to compete, see generally David K. Haase & Darren M.
Mungerson, Agreements Between Employers Not to Hire Each Other’s Employees: When Are They
Enforceable?, 21 LAB. LAW. 277, 279 (2006) (laying out the different avenues through which courts
scrutinize no-poaching agreements).
42. Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 864 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
43. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT & T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 140–41 (3d Cir. 2001).
44. See, e.g., Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 140–41 (recognizing that the labor market is a market for
antitrust purposes); Cesnik, 490 F. Supp. at 864 (same); Silicon Valley’s No-poaching Case: The
Growing Debate over Employee Mobility, KNOWLEDGE AT WHARTON, THE WHARTON SCHOOL
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/silicon-valleys-poaching-casegrowing-debate-employee-mobility/ (pointing out that competition in the labor market is just as
important as competition in product markets). The article contains the following comment from a
Wharton Professor, Joseph Harrington:
In terms of suppressing competition, companies agreeing not to compete for each other’s
employees is the same as companies agreeing not to compete for each other’s customers
. . . . In the latter case, it results in customers paying higher prices because of the lack of
competition, and in the former case it results in workers receiving lower wages because
of the lack of competition.
Id. (internal quotations omitted). Employees typically have antitrust standing to sue an employer for
no-poaching agreements that affect competition for their labor directly. See Roman v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 542, 545 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding an airplane engineer plaintiff was directly
affected by a no-poaching agreement and had antitrust standing because the agreement precluded
the plaintiff from obtaining employment with another aircraft company).
45. See, e.g., Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying the rule
of reason to a no-poaching agreement); Cesnik, 490 F. Supp. at 867–88 (applying the rule of reason).
46. Union Circulation Co., 241 F.2d at 657.
47. Id. (distinguishing the no-poaching agreement at issue from group boycotts in that it dealt
with hiring practices and “supervision of employee conduct” and subsequently applying the rule of
reason).
48. Eichorn, 248 F.3d at 144 (applying rule of reason to no-poaching agreement and declining
per se application).
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the per se rule or the rule of reason applied to the agreements. 49 Most cases
were settled by the payment of fines and a promise that the companies would
cease effectuating no-poaching agreements. 50 In the October 2016 HR
Guidance, the DOJ confirmed that it will continue to pursue no-poaching
agreements as per se violations of Section 1. 51
B. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF NO-POACHING AGREEMENTS
The DOJ’s Antitrust Division has the authority to criminally prosecute
antitrust cases. 52 With regard to criminal liability, Section 1 provides:
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court. 53

The DOJ’s Section 1 policy is to only prosecute agreements
characterized as per se violations criminally, such as price-fixing, bidrigging, and horizontal market allocation agreements. 54 The DOJ has now
added “naked no-poaching agreements” to the list. 55 As mentioned in the
49. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 19 (pursuing no-poaching agreements as per
se violations); see also In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1114–22 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (recognizing that it is a “false assumption” that the rule of reason should automatically
apply to no-poaching agreements).
50. See, e.g., Letter Re: Settlement, In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103
(2012) (No. e5:11-CV-02509-LHK), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/1420/L
etter_re_Settlement.pdf (informing the court that the parties reached a settlement agreement); see
also Notice of Motion & Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement with The Walt Disney Co.,
Pixar, Lucasfilm & Two Pic MC, In Re Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1175
(2015) (No. 5:14CV04062-LHK); Notice of Motion & Motion for Final Approval of Settlement
with Sony Pictures Imageworks Inc., Sony Pictures Animation Inc., and Blue Sky Studios, Inc., In
Re Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1175 (2015) (No. 14-CV-4062-LHK).
51. HR GUIDANCE, supra note 15 at 3.
52. See, e.g., Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, Address Presented at the Fordham
Competition Law Institute’s Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Sept.
14, 2006), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/criminal-enforcement-antitrust-laws-usmodel (“[I]n fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and so far in 2006, the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice has obtained fines of $360 million, $338 million, and $473 million, respectively, and has
brought criminal cases against 69 firms.”).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
54. See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886–87 (2007) (“[T]he
per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of
restraint at issue . . . and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in
all or almost all instances under the rule of reason.”) (citations omitted). The Leegin Court pointed
out that per se violations are usually horizontal restraints—not vertical restraints. Id. at 886; accord
Bedi v. Hewlett–Packard Co., No. CV 07-12318-RWZ, 2008 WL 11226235, at *3 (D. Mass. Nov.
17, 2008) (holding HP and Staples’ agreement that Staples would only sell ink made by HP and
cease selling its own version of the ink was not per se illegal because the agreement was a vertical
agreement that should be analyzed under the rule of reason).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 1; HR GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 3.
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introduction of this Article, although the DOJ has argued that no-poaching
agreements are per se violations, it previously pursued these agreements via
civil prosecution only. 56
As mentioned, courts analyze most antitrust violations under the rule of
reason. 57 Hence, when it comes to most agreements, corporate officials are
exposed to less risks when assessing them for antitrust compliance, and legal
counsels can assist in preparing agreements that comply with the law. 58
However, with per se violations, corporate officials must simply refrain from
the per se activity altogether. 59 Thus, human resource professionals must be
well aware that: (1) the DOJ characterizes naked, no-poaching agreements as
per se violations, and (2) the DOJ now intends to prosecute those agreements
criminally. 60 Because corporate officers may be prosecuted criminally for
violations under Section 1, human resource professionals may be on the hook
for criminal liability if they facilitate naked, no-poaching agreements. 61
The criminal prosecution of Section 1 violations come with greater
penalties for defendants and require the DOJ to prove an additional element.
To be successful in a criminal prosecution, in addition to the usual elements
of an antitrust Section 1 claim, the DOJ must prove that the charged human
resource professionals intended to commit the offense. 62 As the statute
56. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Motion for Application, supra note 18, at 1–3, 13 (requesting application
of the per se rule or a quick-look analysis); see also Lawrence E. Buterman et al., The Department
of Justice Will Criminally Prosecute Employee No-Poaching and Wage-Fixing Agreements,
LATHAM & WATKINS (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/DOJ-willcriminally-prosecute-employee-no-poaching-and-wage-fixing-agreements (“This [decision to
criminally prosecute individuals] signals an additional shift for the Antitrust Division, which in the
recent past has only prosecuted companies for participating in anti-poaching and wage-fixing
agreements.”).
57. See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (noting courts apply the
rule of reason “for the majority of anticompetitive practices challenged under [Section] 1”).
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886 (making clear the per se rule “eliminates the need to study
the reasonableness of an individual restraint in light of the real market forces at work . . . .”); Arizona
v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343–44 (1982) (explaining the per se rule does not
allow any business justifications to be offered).
60. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 1 (stating the purpose of the guidance is to alert human
resource professionals involved in hiring and compensation decisions about potential antitrust
violations that may result from these decisions).
61. See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962). In terms of the meaning of “person”
within the Act, the Supreme Court held regarding criminal prosecutions that “a corporate officer is
subject to prosecution under [Section] 1 of the Sherman Act whenever he knowingly participates in
effecting the illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy—be he one who authorizes, orders, or
helps perpetrate the crime—regardless of whether he is acting in a representative capacity.” Id.
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); accord Lee v. Life Ins. Co. of N.A., 829 F. Supp. 529, 535 (D.R.I.
1993), aff’d, 23 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1994).
[T]o state a valid claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must allege three
elements: (1) the existence of a contract, combination or conspiracy; (2) that the
agreement unreasonably restrained trade under the per se or rule of reason analysis; and
(3) that the restraint affected interstate commerce.
Id.; see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978).
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provides, human resource professionals found guilty of an antitrust violation
may be imprisoned for up to ten years and may be fined for up to one million
dollars. 63 These are crucial implications that one must understand to decipher
the real-world implications of the DOJ’s new policy to pursue anti-poaching
agreements criminally.. While a remarkable volte-face on no-poaching
agreement policy, as this Article will explain, the policy is strongly supported
by well-established antitrust law and labor economics, as no-poaching
agreements have clear anticompetitive effects on labor markets and closely
mirror customer allocation agreements.
II. MARKET ALLOCATION: A PER SE VIOLATION CAPABLE
OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Courts, as well as the DOJ, view market allocations 64 as one of the most
dangerous anticompetitive agreements. 65 Market allocations are at the same
anticompetitive level as price-fixing because they can restrain all
competition, including price competition. 66 As the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals articulated, “[i]t would be a strange interpretation of antitrust law
that forbade competitors to agree on what price to charge, thus eliminating

[W]e hold that a defendant’s state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust
offense which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom and
cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of wrongful
intent from proof of an effect on prices.
Id.; accord United States v. Metro. Enters., Inc., 728 F.2d 444, 449 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Bob
Nichols & Eric Schmitt, Antitrust Violations, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 335, 337 (2011) (“In a criminal
antitrust prosecution, the government must also prove the additional element that the defendant
intended to restrain commerce.”) (citing Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 435); see also Elements of the
Offense, OFF. OF THE U.S. ATT’Y (Nov. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usam/antitrust-resourcemanual-1-attorney-generals-policy-statement [hereinafter Antitrust Resource Manual (Web)]
(listing the elements necessary for an antitrust claim to prevail).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Corporations may be fined up to $100 million or may be fined under the
“alternative fine statute.” Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2012).
64. The schemes are also referred to as market divisions or territorial allocation. See U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET ALLOCATION SCHEMES: WHAT THEY ARE
AND WHAT TO LOOK FOR, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 3, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/a
tr/legacy/2007/10/24/211578.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) [hereinafter, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST PRIMER].
65. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1415 (7th
Cir. 1995) (making clear that market allocations are very dangerous because they restrict “all
competition”); ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 13, at III-12 (“In general, current
Division policy is to proceed by criminal investigation and prosecution in cases involving
horizontal, per se unlawful agreements such as price fixing, bid rigging, and customer and territorial
allocations.”).
66. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 65 F.3d at 1415; ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 13,
at III-12; see also Antitrust Resource Manual (Web), supra note 62 (listing the type of per se
agreements the DOJ criminally prosecutes and listing territorial allocations as one of them).
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price competition among them, but allowed them to divide markets, thus
eliminating all competition among them.” 67
Market allocation occurs when two or more companies agree not to
compete with each other in a market. 68 Companies may arrange the allocation
agreements based on geography (a division by the Western Caribbean and
Eastern Caribbean), customer-type (dividing customers by age group), or
product-type (jewelry stores agreeing to divide the market by jewelry
pieces—earrings, bracelets, rings, and so on). 69 Companies may also arrange
the agreements with regard to specific customers.70 To illustrate, if The Spa
at Renaissance St. Croix Carambola, The Hideaway Spa & Salon at The
Buccaneer Hotel, and the Surfside Spa at Divi Carina Bay, all located in St.
Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, each share their lists of resident clientele with one
another and agree not to compete for each other’s resident customers, the
agreement would be customer allocation based on specific customers in a
specific group. 71
A. HORIZONTAL MARKET ALLOCATION VS. VERTICAL MARKET
ALLOCATION
“[I]n the area of market allocations, because rule of
reason analysis so often ultimately permits vertical market

67. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 65 F.3d at 1415; ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 13,
at III-12; see also Antitrust Resource Manual (Web), supra note 62.
68. See, e.g., Compact v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 594 F. Supp. 1567, 1576
(M.D. Tenn. 1984) (“A horizontal allocation of markets is characterized by three elements: (1)
concerted action between two or more persons; (2) actual or potential competition between the
participants in the conspiracy; and (3) an elimination of competition in the market serviced by the
conspirators.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST PRIMER, supra note 64, at 3 (“Market division
or allocation schemes are agreements in which competitors divide markets among themselves.”).
69. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (holding geographic allocation
between bar review course companies illegal); U.S. v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078,
1090 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding customer allocation agreement illegal); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST PRIMER, supra note 64, at 3 (“In [market division] schemes, competing firms allocate
specific customers or types of customers, products, or territories among themselves.”).
70. See Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d at 1090 (holding customer allocation agreement
illegal).
71. The fact that the customer lists for spa services can be a trade secret, yet the spas are willingly
sharing the lists with each other helps to show that such an agreement would be customer allocation.
See Ruesch v. Ruesch Int’l Monetary Servs., Inc., 479 A.2d 295, 296–97 (D.C. 1984).
The cases are legion in which customer lists have been held to be property in the nature
of a ‘trade secret’ for which an employer is entitled to protection, independent of a nondisclosure contract, either under the law of agency or under the law of unfair trade
practices. Equally true, however, is that the results vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
so that abundant authority may be found on either side of the issue.
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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allocations, the horizontal/vertical determination may be
the key issue in a case.” 72
A horizontal restraint occurs when companies who compete at the same
level in a particular market or industry enter an anticompetitive agreement
(e.g., Procter & Gamble and Colgate-Palmolive). 73 On the other hand, a
vertical restraint occurs when “persons at different levels of the market
structure[,] such as . . . a manufacturer and its distributor,” or a distributor
and retailer enter into an anticompetitive agreement (e.g., Lancôme and
Nordstrom). 74 The distinction is that courts routinely apply the rule of reason
to agreements that create vertical restraints, including vertical market
allocations. 75 Whereas, courts usually condemn agreements that create
horizontal restraints and almost always apply the per se rule to them. 76 Hence,
this Section focuses on horizontal market allocations.
B. THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF HORIZONTAL MARKET
ALLOCATIONS AND THE AGREEMENTS’ TENDENCY TO
RESTRICT ALL COMPETITION IN MARKETS
Horizontal market allocation agreements are almost always per se
violations. 77 To understand why courts view these agreements as highly
anticompetitive, it is important to understand perfect competition and the
72. Val D. Ricks & R. Chet Loftis, Seeing the Diagonal Clearly: Telling Vertical from
Horizontal in Antitrust Law, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 151, 155 (1996). Compare Palmer, 498 U.S. at 49
(analyzing a geographic market allocation under the per se rule), with Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1997) (holding courts should judge non-price vertical restraints, like
vertical geographical allocation, under the rule of reason).
73. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST PRIMER, supra note 64, at 3 (explaining market
allocations). One classic example of companies who compete with each other at the same level is
Coca-Cola and PepsiCo competing in the beverage industry as beverage manufacturers. See Kim
Bhasin, COKE VS. PEPSI: The Amazing Story Behind the Cola Wars, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 2, 2011,
5:40 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/soda-wars-coca-cola-pepsi-history-infographic-201111 (articulating the history of the Coke vs. Pepsi market competition).
74. ELGA A. GOODMAN ET AL., 50A NEW JERSEY PRACTICE, BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK §
23:12 (2017–2018 ed.).
75. Compare Palmer, 498 U.S. at 49 (applying the per se rule to a horizontal territorial allocation
agreement), with Cont’l T. V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 36 (applying the rule of reason to a vertical allocation
agreement).
76. Compare Palmer, 498 U.S. at 49, with Cont’l T. V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 36.
77. See E. Food Servs., Inc. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, Inc., 357 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 2004) (“Almost the only important categories of agreements that reliably deserve [a per se]
label today are those among competitors that amount to ‘naked’ price fixing, output restriction, or
division of customers or territories.”); see, e.g., Palmer, 498 U.S. at 49 (analyzing a geographic
market allocation under the per se rule); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 596
(1972) (same); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 350 (1967) (same). But for an explanation
of when the rule of reason might apply to horizontal allocations, see, e.g., Rozema v. Marshfield
Clinic, 977 F. Supp. 1362, 1374, 1378 (W.D. Wis. 1997) (“Market allocations that accompany and
promote the success of larger endeavors are considered ‘ancillary’ trade restraints and warrant more
in-depth analysis under the Rule of Reason.”). Such ancillary restraints in relation to horizontal
market allocations are rare, however. See id.
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markers of a perfectly competitive market. A perfectly competitive market
“is a hypothetical market where competition is at its greatest possible level[,
and] . . . economists argue[] that perfect competition would produce the best
possible outcomes for consumers, and society . . .” due to increased market
efficiency. 78 An industry or market achieves perfect competition if
the following five criteria are met: 1) All firms sell an identical product; 2)
All firms are price takers . . . [—] they cannot control the market price of
their product; 3) All firms have a relatively small market share; 4) Buyers
have complete information about the product being sold and the prices
charged by each firm; and 5) The industry is characterized by freedom of
entry and exit. 79

Though perfect competition is rarely ever achieved in the real world,
antitrust law and economic theory discourage artificial alterations of perfect
competition and market efficiency. 80 Now, having established the
benchmarks of perfect competition, it is easier to recognize why courts
characterize market allocation agreements as being just as problematic as
price-fixing.
Antitrust analysis has made clear that horizontal market allocation
agreements are anticompetitive because they eliminate or restrain
competition. 81 These agreements eliminate customer competition (whether
by region, product-type, or other allocation schemes) by eradicating freedom
to enter into particular territories and so on. 82 Further, with market allocation
agreements, companies are not price-takers because the agreements give
them the power to restrict output and set high prices—in effect, eliminating
price competition. 83 Moreover, the agreements are contrary to consumers’

78. Perfect Competition, ECONOMICS ONLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_ec
onomics/Perfect_competition.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2017).
79. Perfect Competition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/perfectcompetit
ion.asp#ixzz4fZvVTbT9 (last visited Apr. 27, 2017).
80. See Chris Gallant, Does Perfect Competition Exist in the Real World?, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/05/perfectcompetition.asp (last updated Feb. 1, 2018)
(pointing out that perfect competition is seldom achieved in real world markets); U.S. Antitrust
Policy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/corporate-regulation/us-antitrust-policy/p
29984 (last updated Feb. 6, 2014) (“U.S. antitrust law aims to increase the economic efficiency of
markets by preventing firms from unduly limiting competition.”).
81. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1415 (7th Cir.
1995) (making clear that market division eliminates all competition, including price competition).
82. See id.
83. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2005)
(“Horizontal agreements between competitors are antitrust’s most ‘suspect’ classification, which as
a group provoke closer scrutiny than any other arrangement. . . . As a general class, agreements
between competitors to allocate markets are clearly anticompetitive, with the obvious tendency to
diminish output and raise prices.”) (citations omitted); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST PRIMER,
supra note 64, at 3.
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freedom of choice, as they pre-select which consumers will have access to
certain products in the market, which is contrary to antitrust policy. 84
Hence, courts—recognizing that market allocation agreements
artificially eliminate customer competition, price competition, and consumer
choice, contrary to both antitrust and economic principles—have opined that
these agreements are so anticompetitive that they warrant the application of
the per se rule. 85 As such, courts believe these agreements are deserving of
the rigid per se rule even where they remove only “some” competition. 86
C. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF MARKET ALLOCATION
AGREEMENTS
As horizontal market allocation agreements are almost always per se
violations, they may be prosecuted criminally under Section 1. 87 United
States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc. 88 is one case in which the DOJ prosecuted a
market allocation agreement criminally. 89 There, two roofing companies and
their presidents were charged with violating Section 1 due to an agreement
among them allocating and dividing customers for their roof construction and
installation services. 90 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
agreement was a per se violation, there was sufficient evidence to show that
the companies conspired with each other, and that the presidents had the
requisite intent to satisfy a criminal antitrust claim. 91
D. CUSTOMER ALLOCATIONS
Courts treat customer allocation agreements the same as any other market
allocation agreement. 92 Hence, the per se rule applies to horizontal customer
84. See, e.g., THOMAS J. COLLIN & MATTHEW D. RIDINGS, 12 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. §
129:54 (4th ed. 2017) (indicating that one of the reasons horizontal market allocations are per se
violations is that “customers have no choice but to purchase from the seller that has rights in their
territory”).
85. See, e.g., E. Food Servs., Inc. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, Inc., 357 F.3d 1, 4
(1st Cir. 2004); Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990); United States v. Topco Assocs.,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 350 (1967).
86. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1995) (making clear a market
allocation agreement only has to eliminate some competition to be treated as a per se violation). In
Blackburn, the competitors, who were attorneys in Indiana, argued their agreement not to advertise
in each other’s territories only accounted for 90% of clients, and therefore, did not completely
restrain competition. Id. The court made clear that whether advertising accounted for all their clients
was immaterial; as long as allocation was intended, the per se standard applied. Id.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1080 (5th Cir. 1978)
(ruling on the appeal of a criminal prosecution for a customer allocation agreement).
88. United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1990)
89. Id. at 471–72.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 476–81.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 449 F.3d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting customer
allocations are per se violations). In Rose, a corporate official was convicted of customer allocation.
Id.; see also United States v. Goodman, 850 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he government
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allocation agreements and criminal liability is possible. 93 For instance, in
United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp. 94—a criminal prosecution—
the court applied the per se rule to a customer allocation agreement in which
linen suppliers agreed not to compete for each other’s established
customers. 95 According to the court, it is immaterial whether a market
allocation agreement is allocated by geography or customers; regardless, the
per se rule would still apply. 96
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT NO-POACHING AGREEMENTS
As explained in Part II, courts have been hesitant to apply the per se rule
to no-poaching agreements. 97 This Section examines the kinds of nopoaching agreements that may be on the hook for per se liability and the types
that courts may analyze under the rule of reason and likely uphold .
Reviewing the characteristics of the per se rule and the rule of reason, nopoaching agreements will help to demonstrate that the anticompetitive effects
of naked no-poaching agreements warrant the DOJ’s policy to criminally
pursue the use of no-poaching agreements.
A. NAKED NO-POACHING AGREEMENTS
If a no-poaching agreement (1) serves no legitimate business purpose, or
(2) serves a legitimate business purpose but is not narrowly tailored to meet
that purpose, courts will find a violation of Section 1. 98 The no-poaching
agreement in Union Circulation Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 99 for
instance, was among magazine and periodical subscription companies that
is correct that a customer allocation agreement is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.”); United
States v. Coop. Theatres of Ohio, 845 F.2d 1367, 1371–72 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying the per se rule
to movie theaters’ agreement not to solicit each other’s customers); In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“For more than a
century, agreements between actual or potential competitors to allocate territories or customers have
been considered per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1081 (5th Cir. 1978)
(ruling on the appeal of criminal prosecution for a customer allocation agreement among garment
supplier companies).
94. United States v. Consol. Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961).
95. Id. at 574–75.
96. Id.
Assuming that customers were allocated in the case at bar, no more need be proved; we
agree that the per se rule should be applied. We fail to see any significant difference
between an allocation of customers and an allocation of territory. . . . [T]heir agreement
to suppress all competition as to one phase of their business, i.e., old customers, should
be per se illegal irrespective of their competition for new customers.
Id.

97. See supra Part I (mentioning that no-poaching agreements have mostly been examined under
rule of reason).
98. See Grimmer, supra note 15.
99. Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 654 (2d Cir. 1957).
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offered door-to-door service. 100 The companies agreed that they would
refrain from hiring each other’s employees for specific periods of time, often
one year. 101 The business justification offered by the employers was that the
agreements were created to promote good conduct because salesmen in their
industry had been engaged in a number of dishonorable and fraudulent
practices, including misappropriation of funds and the misrepresentation of
magazine and periodical content. 102 The rationale was that without the
agreements, the salesmen would be able to freely switch to another employer
in the industry, and therefore, would be less likely to observe the employers’
policies against fraudulent practices or respond to employer discipline for
such behavior. 103 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals opined that the
companies had violated Section 1 because the agreements harmed
competition by freezing employee mobility. 104 The agreement—the court
reasoned—was not sufficiently tailored to achieve the goal of deterring
fraudulent salesmen, because the agreement affected all salesmen. 105 The
agreement’s reach to all salesmen was beyond what was reasonably
necessary to prevent only those salesmen who engaged in fraudulent acts
from escaping liability. 106
No-poaching agreements like the agreement in Union Circulation Co. are
naked restraints, which the Supreme Court of the United States has long held
violate Section 1. 107 The DOJ has pursued certain anti-poaching agreements
as per se violations on the premise that they are naked restraints.108 For
instance, in a complaint about an agreement among employers not to “cold
call” 109 each other’s employees, the DOJ argued that the purpose of the

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 654.
Id. at 655.
Id.
Id. at 658; see also Haase & Mungerson, supra note 41, at 285 (“The
focus of antitrust claims is on the effect an agreement has on the public, rather than the impacted
employees. [If an agreement] . . . only affect[s] internal matters within the companies, there was no
effect on the public, and thus, no antitrust implications.”).
104. Union Circulation Co., 241 F.2d at 658. The court also found the agreement to be an unfair
method of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act. See id.
105. Id. The court also mentioned that the agreement disadvantaged new competitors (e.g., startups) who needed sales representatives as employees. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 211 (1899) (affirming the
ancillary restraints doctrine set forth by Justice William Howard Taft’s Sixth Circuit decision, which
provides that naked restraints violate the Sherman Act); see also In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust
Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2012). There, the court pointed out that the notion
that all no-poaching agreements should be analyzed under the rule of reason is a “false assumption.”
Id. The naked vs. ancillary restraint analysis applies to no-poaching agreements. See id.
108. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 19.
109. See id. at 8 (arguing that that “cold calling” is an effective recruitment method that promotes
labor mobility and competitive wages, so the elimination of cold calling results in an elimination of
competition). The Complaint mentions that “the recipient of the cold call has an opportunity to use
competition among potential employers to increase her compensation and mobility.” Id.

2018]

Talent Can't Be Allocated

297

agreement was to restrict employee mobility and reduce wages. 110
Specifically regarding two companies, Apple and Pixar, the DOJ argued that
the agreement applied to all of their employees and was not narrowly tailored
by “geography, job function, product group, or time period, and [the
agreement] was not ancillary to any legitimate collaboration between the
companies.” 111
B. ANCILLARY NO-POACHING AGREEMENTS
“[C]ombinations, such as mergers, [and] joint ventures . . .
hold the promise of increasing a firm’s efficiency and
enabling it to compete more effectively. Accordingly, such
combinations are judged under a rule of reason . . . to
assess the combination’s [sic] actual effect.”112
Though naked no-poaching agreements violate Section 1, there are
instances in which no-poaching agreements may be ancillary restraints aimed
at a legitimate business purpose. 113 Examples include no-poaching
agreements in the context of intra-enterprises, joint ventures, and mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) transactions. 114 Even in these contexts, however,
businesses must carefully execute the agreements to ensure that they are
narrowly tailored by scope, duration, job function, product type, geography,
or a combination of these limits. 115
1. M&A Transactions and Divestitures
Courts give credence to no-poaching agreements made during an
acquisition of a company or part of a company, because they serve to ensure
that the acquirer obtains the benefits of its purchase, including the
employees. 116 For instance, in Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 117 Chrysler sold its
Airtemp Division (Airtemp) to Fedders Corporation (Fedders). As part of the
deal—to maintain Fedders’ interest in purchasing Airtemp—Chrysler
entered into a no-poaching agreement with Fedders not to rehire employees
110. See id. at 10 (“Defendants entered into the express agreements and entered into the
overarching conspiracy with knowledge of the other Defendants’ participation, and with the intent
of accomplishing the conspiracy’s objective: to reduce employee compensation and mobility
through eliminating competition for skilled labor.”).
111. See id. (mentioning the agreement between Apple and Pixar applied to all employees and
was not narrowly tailored in duration or scope).
112. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
113. See generally Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 859 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See, e.g., Coleman v. Gen. Elec. Co., 643 F. Supp. 1229, 1243 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff’d, 822
F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying the rule of reason to a no-poaching agreement entered into after
the sale of a corporation); Cesnik, 490 F. Supp. at 868 (holding that a no-poaching agreement used
to effectuate an acquisition was a reasonable ancillary restraint).
117. Cesnik, 490 F. Supp. at 862.
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who worked with Airtemp at the time of the sale. 118 The employees who
worked with Airtemp brought suit under Section 1. 119 Applying the rule of
reason, the court ruled that the restraint was reasonable and ancillary to the
sale of Airtemp because Airtemp’s employees were considered to be its
assets; therefore, the agreement secured Fedders’ benefits in purchasing
Airtemp. 120 The agreement was also appropriately tailored to effectuate the
sale, as it only applied to the specific employees affected by the
acquisition. 121
Similarly, in Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 122 the court evaluated a nopoaching agreement between a parent company (AT&T) and one of its
affiliates, after a divestiture. 123 The agreement only applied to employees
who made $50,000 or more per year and had a restricted duration of eight
months. 124 The court opined that this agreement was a reasonable and
ancillary restraint that was appropriately limited in scope and duration. The
court further stated that the agreement did not have a “significant
anticompetitive effect” on labor in the industry by, for instance, fixing
wages. 125
2. “Legitimate Joint Ventures”
Narrowly tailored no-poaching agreements entered into during
collaborations or joint ventures are reasonable under Section 1. 126
Agreements arising out of joint ventures between companies are agreements
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. (The plaintiffs had standing.)
Id. at 868 (The court refused to apply the per se standard.)
Id. (The court also noted that the agreement was similar to a covenant not to compete.)
Eichorn v. AT & T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 141 (In sum, AT&T sold a subsidiary to an affiliate.)
Id. at 136–37.
Id. at 148 (holding under the rule of reason the agreement did not violate antitrust laws
because it did not fix labor costs in the industry and did not interfere with the plaintiff’s ability to
freely seek employment in the industry); see also Michael Lindsay & Katherine Santon, No
Poaching Allowed: Antitrust Issues in Labor Markets, 26 ANTITRUST 3, 74 (2012),
http://files.dorsey.com/files/Upload/eU_LE_antitrust_poaching_072412.pdf
(“Although the Eichorn opinion does not clearly say so, the post-spin former affiliates were
probably not significant competitors of each other, at least not as of immediately after the spin-off.
Nevertheless, there was an efficiency-based justification for the restraint[.]”).
126. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 15; accord Buterman et al., supra note 56.
The Antitrust Guidance explains that legitimate joint ventures, such as appropriate shared
use of facilities, are not considered per se illegal under the antitrust laws. Accordingly,
tailored agreements to restrict hiring that are “reasonably necessary” for legitimate
collaborations may not violate the antitrust laws. In a blog post accompanying the
Antitrust Guidance, FTC officials Debbie Feinstein, Geoffrey Green and Tara Koslov
also identify “consulting services, outsourcing vendors, and mergers or acquisitions” as
part of a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which no-poaching agreements or other
restraints on recruiting and compensation may not violate the antitrust laws.
Id.
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between a single firm. 127 In a joint venture, the companies are not competing;
rather, they are working toward a unified goal and have the same economic
power in regard to the joint venture. 128 The DOJ has made it clear that
agreements in furtherance of joint ventures are not the type of no-poaching
agreements the Antitrust Division expects to prosecute as criminal per se
violations. 129 The HR Guidance specifically provides that “[l]egitimate joint
ventures . . . [between employers] are not considered per se illegal under the
antitrust laws.” 130
3. Agreements between Intra-Enterprises
An agreement or conspiracy that violates Section 1 must be between two
or more companies. 131 Under the Copperweld doctrine, coordination between
a parent company and its wholly-owned subsidiary is the collaboration of a
single enterprise, so long as common interests and objectives exist between
the parent company and the subsidiary. 132 Under the doctrine, no-poaching
agreements between parent companies and subsidiaries are reasonable
because if there is a unity of interests, the conspiracy element of Section 1 is
absent. 133 A single-enterprise’s policy not to hire amongst its businesses is
merely an internal decision that does not impact the general public. 134 For
127. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 2, 3 (2006). In Texaco, Texaco and Shell entered a joint
venture company called Equilon Enterprises to sell oil in western states. Id. at 3. The companies
decided to sell the oil under their original brands and sell the oil for the same price. Id. Gas station
owners sued the companies claiming price-fixing, a per se violation of Section 1. Id. The Court held,
though the companies set a single price, the per se standard did not apply because the companies
were not competing as they were involved in a joint venture and the single price arose out of that
joint venture. Id. at 6–8.
128. See, e.g., id.
129. See HR GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 3.
130. Id.; see also Texaco, 547 U.S. at 3.
131. See Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 1938) (“[A] combination of two or
more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose
not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means.”) (quoting Marino v. United
States, 91 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1937)).
132. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 755 (1984) (holding Copperweld
Corp. and its subsidiary, Regal, were “incapable” of conspiracy because they shared a community
of interests). A well-known example of an organization that does not meet the Copperweld doctrine
is the National Football League (NFL). See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S.
183, 184 (2010). In American Needle, the NFL was not a single enterprise because it consisted of
32 teams that, inter alia, competed, had different owners, were independently managed, and held
separate economic power (rather than “a single aggregation of economic power”). Id. (“They
compete with one another, not only on the playing field, but to attract fans, for gate receipts, and for
contracts with managerial and playing personnel. . . .”). The Court also noted that when NFL teams
license their intellectual property, they are “potentially competing.” Id. To illustrate the Court’s
point, the Giants and the Patriots may compete for brands, such as Reebok or Nike, rather than come
together as a unit to get deals with Reebok or Nike for all 32 teams in the NFL. See id. (supporting
this example).
133. See Thomsen v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 680 F.2d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding a company
can restrict its employees from moving to its subsidiaries).
134. See id. at 1268.
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instance, in Thomsen v. Western Electric Co., 135 a phone company restricted
its employees from moving between its subsidiary companies. 136 Upholding
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the company, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that “actions of affiliated corporations which
touch only on internal operations and have no anti-competitive consequences
cannot violate [Section] 1.” 137
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE BASIC ECONOMICS OF THE
LABOR MARKET
To fully grasp the effect that no-poaching agreements have on
employees’ wages and mobility, thereby restricting competition, a basic
understanding of labor economics is necessary. This Section will describe the
landscape of a perfectly competitive labor market. In addition, the Section
will explain how no-poaching agreements affect each characteristic of perfect
competition, contrary to antitrust policy to promote and assure competitive
markets. Upon reviewing basic labor economic principles, it will become
apparent that labor economics fully supports the DOJ’s policy to pursue nopoaching agreements criminally.
“A perfectly competitive labor market has the following characteristics[:]
(1) a large number of firms competing to hire a specific type of labor, (2)
135. Id. at 1265.
136. Id. at 1265–66. The subsidiaries were Western Electric and Pacific Telephone, and the parent

company was American Telephone and Telegraph Company (referred to as AT&T). Id. at 1266.
137. Id. at 1266 (noting the practice of not hiring employees who are already part of the company
as a whole was a “matter of internal management”). The Thomsen view has been applied in the
franchise context. See Williams v. Nevada, 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1026 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d sub nom.
Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993). Following Thomsen, the United States
District Court of Nevada held that a no-poaching agreement between franchisees did not restrain
competition because franchisees operate as a single entity. Id. at 1031–32. The court reasoned:
In a fast-food franchise the franchisor does everything to promote a uniform, noncompetitive environment between the franchises: Each franchise serves substantially the
same products; the products are served to the public in the same manner; the franchisor
develops products and services for all franchises; the employees dress alike; the decor of
each franchise is similar; the franchises are advertised as a single enterprise with a single
logo; and the franchisor contracts with each franchise for exclusivity within a certain
geographic area to minimize competition between the franchises.
Id. at 1031; see also In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. Supp. 2d 274, 289
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[T]he plenary control of the franchisor and the common economic goals makes
them a single entity . . . .”) (citing Williams, 794 F. Supp. at 1032). The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the decision on appeal. Compare Williams, 999 F.2d at 447 (agreeing that a singleenterprise existed and upholding the district court’s grant of summary judgment). Louis Altman &
Malla Pollack, 3 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 16:43
(4th ed. 2017) (“The reasoning in the Williams case is questionable, however, because cofranchisees
are in a competitive relationship with each other for some purposes, including the hiring of
employees.”). However, with regard to franchisees, a counterargument exists. Id. (calling into
question the soundness of the Williams court’s reasoning). One commentator stated, “[t]he
reasoning in the Williams case is questionable . . . because cofranchisees are in a competitive
relationship with each other for some purposes, including the hiring of employees.” Id.
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numerous people with homogeneous skills who independently supply their
labor services, (3) wage-taking behavior, and (4) perfect, costless information
and labor mobility.” 138 As previously mentioned, perfect competition will
never be precisely achieved in traditional product markets, but the goal is to
come as close as possible to perfect competition; the same principle applies
to labor markets. 139
In a perfectly competitive labor market, firms are forced to pay workers
the equilibrium wage because if they offer lower wages, workers will seek
employment in firms that pay the equilibrium wage. 140 Similarly, workers are
forced to take the equilibrium wage rate 141 because their earning potential is
uniform among firms. 142 This balanced interplay between the equilibrium
wage, workers, and employers is the meaning of wage-taking behavior. 143
The equilibrium market wage is the meeting point for supply and demand in
a specific labor industry; in other words, supply equals demand. 144
Consequently, disequilibrium in the labor market is common. 145 When labor
supply is higher than labor demand, it creates disequilibrium, which results
in a decrease in wage rate; this typically occurs in labor industries that do not

138. Survey of Labor Economics and Institutions Liberal Studies, B2D1: Course Lecture Notes
and Interactive Graphs, Chapter 6: Wage Determination and the Allocation of Labor, Theory of a
Perfectly Competitive Labor Market, IND. ST. U., http://isu.indstate.edu/conant/ecn351/ch6/chapte
r6.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2017) [hereainfter Wage Determination and the Allocation of Labor].
139. See Gallant, supra note 80 (pointing out that perfect competition is seldom achieved in real
world markets).
140. See Wage Determination in Perfectly Competitive Labour Markets, ECONOMICSHELP,
http://www.economicshelp.org/labour-markets/wage-determination/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017)
(explaining how wages behave in a perfectly competitive market); Demand for Labor,
ECONOMICSHELP, http://www.economicshelp.org/labour-markets/demand-labour/ (last visited
Apr. 6, 2017) (explaining that firms are wage-takers in a perfectly competitive labor market).
141. Wage rate can also be referred to as the price or cost of labor. See Cost of Labor,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cost-of-labor.asp#ixzz4ekIud999
(last
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (“The cost of labor is the sum of all wages paid to employees, as well as the
cost of employee benefits and payroll taxes paid by an employer.”).
142. See Wage Determination in Perfectly Competitive Labour Markets, supra note 140
(explaining wage behavior in a perfectly competitive market).
143. See id.
144. Id. At equilibrium, everyone—employers and workers—is satisfied with the labor market.
See Wage Determination and the Allocation of Labor, supra note 138 (“If the quantity supplied
does not equal the quantity demanded, someone (a labor buyer or seller) will be unable to realize
their desires, and the wage will be bid up or down by these frustrated labor market participants.”);
GEORGE J. B ORJAS, L ABOR ECONOMICS 145 (7th ed. 1959), available at https://www.hks.har
vard.edu/fs/gborjas/publications/books/LE/LEChapter4.pdf (“The wage w * is the market-clearing
wage because any other wage level would create either upward or downward pressures on the wage;
there would be too many jobs chasing the few available workers or too many workers competing
for the few available jobs.”).
145. See Gallant, supra note 80 (explaining that real world markets are imperfect); see also
Disequilibrium, ECONOMICSHELP, http://www.economicshelp.org/concepts/disequilibrium/ (last
visited Apr. 13, 2017) (explaining that disequilibrium occurs “when the markets fail to clear and
find their final equilibrium point”).
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require highly skilled workers. 146 Further, when labor demand is higher than
labor supply, creating disequilibrium, wage rates increase—typically
occurring in industries that require highly skilled workers. 147
In labor industries, elasticity in labor supply and demand can affect wage
rates. 148 Labor elasticity refers to the way employers and workers respond to
changes in wage rates. 149 The way workers respond to the wage rate
represents the elasticity of labor supply. 150 If labor supply is elastic—having
an abundance of workers—labor supply (workers) would be available at a
constant wage rate. 151 For instance, the labor supply of Wendy’s 152 workers
remains relatively elastic because many people can perform the job. 153
On the other hand, to enter highly skilled industries—for instance, the
technology, medical, and legal fields—workers must have industry
qualifications, such as specialized or professional degrees and training (e.g.,
residencies in medicine) and may need to sit for requisite exams (e.g., the
Professional Engineer exam or the Bar exam). 154 The industry qualifications
necessary in those fields create barriers to entering the industries, which
results in low labor supply of skilled workers. 155 Because there is not an
abundance of skilled workers, labor supply is inelastic in labor industries that
require skilled workers, having little or no response to changes in wage
rates. 156

146. See B ORJAS, supra note 144, at 164–79 (mentioning pressures on wages include an
overabundance of supply where there are few jobs and high demand where there are not enough
workers).
147. Id.
148. See ECON 390 – Labor Economics, Labor Elasticity Concepts, FORT LEWIS C., http://facu
lty.fortlewis.edu/walker_d/econ_390_-_handout_on.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2017) [hereinafter
Labor Elasticity Concepts] (explaining elasticity in the labor market).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.; see also Wage Determination in Perfectly Competitive Labour Markets, supra note
140.
152. Wendy’s is an international fast food chain restaurant headquartered in the United States.
See About Us, WENDY’S, https://www.wendys.com/en-us/about-wendys (last visited Feb. 4, 2018);
see also Find Jobs, WENDY’S, https://careers.wendys.com/?_ga=2.134569784.897527081.151709
9988-1690818642.1517099969 (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).
153. See Wage Determination in Perfectly Competitive Labour Markets, supra note 140
(explaining that McDonald’s workers receive lower pay than lawyers because the supply of
McDonald’s workers is elastic).
154. See e.g., PE Exam, NAT’L COUNCIL OF EXAMINERS FOR ENGINEERING AND SURVEYING,
http://ncees.org/engineering/pe/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) (explaining the purpose of the PE exam
and the necessary qualifications to sit for the exam); Regular Admissions, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S. V.I.,
http://www.visupremecourt.org/Professional_Regulation/Bar_Admission/Regular_Admissions/
(last visited Apr. 13, 2017) (explaining that an applicant must graduate from an American Bar
Association accredited law school to sit for the U.S. Virgin Islands Bar Exam).
155. See Wage Determination and the Allocation of Labor, supra note 138 (pointing out that
when a lot of training is required, labor supply decreases).
156. Id. (“[T]he more specialized the type of labor, the less elastic the labor supply curve.”).
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The way employers respond to changes in wage rates is the elasticity of
labor demand. 157 It depends on “[l]abour costs as a % of total costs[,] . . .
[t]he ease and cost of factor substitution[,] . . . [and,] [t]he price elasticity of
demand for the final output produced by a business . . . .” 158 It is more difficult
for firms to substitute highly skilled workers even though artificial
intelligence exists; thus, demand for highly skilled workers is typically
high. 159 The high demand for skilled workers typically increases wage rates
as firms compete for the low supply of those workers. 160
Having laid out the labor economics foundation necessary to comprehend
and effectively discern that labor economics and the principles of antitrust
support the DOJ’s policy to pursue anti-poaching agreements criminally, let
us turn to a thorough analysis of the policy’s soundness.
V. EMPLOYEE ALLOCATION: PROVING NAKED NOPOACHING AGREEMENTS AS HIGHLY ANTICOMPETITIVE
AND DESERVING OF PER SE CONDEMNATION AND
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Labor economics and per se antitrust analysis overwhelmingly supports
the DOJ’s decision to prosecute naked no-poaching agreements criminally. .
It is true that courts have traditionally applied the rule of reason to nopoaching agreements and when using the rule of reason, courts have

157. See Labor Elasticity Concepts, supra note 148 (explaining elasticity in the labor market).
158. Elasticity of Labour Demand (Labour Demands), TUTOR2U, https://www.tutor2u.net/econ

omics/reference/labour-market-elasticity-of-labour-demand (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) (explaining
the factors that affect the demand for labor). The source provides:
[Labor] costs as a % of total costs: When [labor] expenses are a high proportion of total
costs, then labour demand is more elastic than a business where fixed costs of capital are
the dominant business expense. In many service jobs such as customer service [centers]
or gas boiler repairs, [labor] costs are a high proportion of the total costs of a business.
The ease and cost of factor substitution: [Labor] demand will be more elastic when a firm
can substitute quickly and easily between [labor] and capital inputs. When specialised
[labor] or capital is needed, then the demand for labour will be more inelastic with respect
to the wage rate. For example[,] it might be fairly easy and cheap to replace security
guards with cameras but a hotel would find it almost impossible to replace hotel cleaning
staff with machinery!
The price elasticity of demand for the final output produced by a business: If a firm is
operating in a highly competitive market where final demand for the product is price
elastic, they may have little market power to pass on higher wage costs to consumers
through a higher price. The demand for [labor] may therefore be more elastic as a
consequence. In contrast, a firm that sells a product where final demand is inelastic will
be better placed to pass on higher costs to consumers.
Id.

159. See id.
160. See id.
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frequently upheld these agreements. 161 However, in such cases the nopoaching agreements in question were seemingly ancillary to a legitimate
business purpose. 162
Courts have enough experience with naked restraints and no-poaching
agreements to identify when agreements constitute naked no-poaching
agreements, especially if they are akin to the untailored, overbroad agreement
that was at issue in Union Circulation Co. 163 Further, because no-poaching
agreements are similar in nature to customer allocation agreements, a strong
history of antitrust analyses and rationales support the per se characterization
of naked no-poaching agreements. Given courts’ experience with naked
restraints and no-poaching agreements, along with the effect that naked nopoaching agreements have on labor markets, it is appropriate to characterize
naked no-poaching agreements as per se violations.
A. NAKED NO-POACHING AGREEMENTS’ EFFECTS ON LABOR
MARKETS SUPPORT PER SE TREATMENT
While a perfectly competitive labor market is rarely ever achieved in the
real world, the labor market’s imperfections should not be the result of
artificial manipulation by the market’s players; rather, the labor market’s
imperfections should be organic. 164 Recall that in a perfectly competitive
labor market, there are “(1) a large number of firms competing to hire a
specific type of labor, (2) numerous people with homogeneous skills who
independently supply their labor services, (3) wage-taking behavior, and (4)
perfect, costless information and labor mobility.” 165 No-poaching agreements
among employers in specific industries artificially alter three characteristics
of a competitive labor market—many firms competing to hire labor, wagetaking behavior, and labor mobility. 166
First, there is no dispute that no-poaching agreements, by their nature,
eliminate competition among employers for specific types of labor. 167 When
161. See, e.g., Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 1957) (applying the rule
of reason to a no-poaching agreement); Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 867 (M.D.
Tenn. 1980) (applying the rule of reason).
162. See, e.g., Cesnik, 490 F. Supp. at 861 (holding that a no-poaching agreement used to
effectuate an acquisition was a reasonably ancillary restraint); see also supra Part III, Section B
(evaluating ancillary no-poaching agreements).
163. See, e.g., Union Circulation Co., 241 F.2d at 657 (holding a no-poaching agreement was
illegal because it was not narrowly tailored toward the target employees engaged in fraudulent
conduct, as it affected all employees).
164. See Gallant, supra note 80 (pointing out that perfect competition is seldom achieved in real
world markets); see also supra Part IV (explaining the basic economics of the labor market).
165. Wage Determination and the Allocation of Labor, supra note 138.
166. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 10 (explaining the cold call agreement
restricts mobility and eliminates competition).
167. See, e.g., Union Circulation Co., 241 F.2d at 657 (holding a no-poaching agreement that
makes no effort to limit its scope or duration violates antitrust laws); see also Amended Complaint,
supra note 6.

2018]

Talent Can't Be Allocated

305

employers agree not to poach each other’s employees, they are saying, “I
won’t recruit your employees if you don’t recruit mine.” 168 This concept
either eliminates or minimizes competition among employers competing for
specific types of labor. 169
Second, as previously mentioned, wage-taking behavior means that
employers would be forced to pay employees the equilibrium wage rate for
specific occupations. 170 No-poaching agreements among employers
artificially alter this wage-taking behavior in industry labor markets. 171 Given
that one way employers typically compete for each other’s employees is to
offer competitors’ employees higher wages, no-poaching agreements
decrease the likelihood of any employer offering employees higher wages, as
they have agreed not to poach each other’s employees. 172 This effect results
in employees in similar positions at different companies all receiving the
same or similar artificially lowered wages.173 This is a wage-fixing effect
created by employers altering the wage-taking behavior of a competitive
labor market. 174
The opposing argument is that employers who need to hire skilled
employees might argue that the labor market is already imperfect because the
low supply of highly skilled employees creates disequilibrium, and therefore,
their no-poaching agreements do not have a large effect on already imperfect
markets. 175 This argument is both immaterial and flawed because: (1)
antitrust law does not permit business justifications for per se violations, like
wage-fixing, and (2) antitrust law does not focus on natural disequilibrium in

168. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 7–9 (explaining that agreeing not to cold call
eliminates a big part of recruiting employees from competitors).
169. See, e.g., Union Circulation Co., 241 F.2d at 657 (holding competition was eliminated with
regard to the employees’ skills without a legitimate business purpose).
170. See Wage Determination in Perfectly Competitive Labour Markets, supra note 140
(explaining how wages behave in a perfectly competitive market); Demand for Labor, supra note
140 (explaining that individuals are wage-takers in a perfectly competitive labor market).
171. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Giuseppe Moscarini & Fabien Postel-Vinay, The Timing of Labor Market
Expansions: New Facts and a New Hypothesis 1–2 (unpublished manuscript) available at
https://campuspress.yale.edu/moscarini/files/2017/01/bmdynamicNBER_MA-1nypi6q.pdf
(“Firms offer higher wages only when they run out of cheap unemployed job applicants and find it
profitable to steal employees from their competitors, who in turn fight back and start paying more
to retain their workers.”).
173. See id. If there is no competition for employees, firms have little desire and decreased
pressures to increase wages. Id.
174. BORJAS, supra note 144, at 187–97 (discussing how wages respond to a lack of competition
for employees in a labor market).
175. Id. at 145 (“The wage w * is the market-clearing wage because any other wage level would
create either upward or downward pressures on the wage; there would be too many jobs chasing the
few available workers or too many workers competing for the few available jobs.”); Disequilibrium,
supra note 145 (explaining disequilibrium takes “when the markets fail to clear and find their final
equilibrium point”).
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the market; rather it focuses on restrictions on competition and artificial
disruptions by players in the market. 176
Lastly, no-poaching agreements restrict labor mobility and infringe on
employees’ freedom of choice. 177 Recruitment is one integral way that
employers compete for talented employees. 178 Hence, when employers agree
not to recruit or poach each other’s employees, they are using the agreement
as a tool to retain their best employees and prevent those employees from
moving to competitors. 179 While employers may be well-intentioned with
regard to looking out for their companies’ best interests, no-poaching
agreements are contrary to employees’ mobility. 180 In a competitive market,
employees should be able to freely move to other companies, but nopoaching agreements artificially interfere with that freedom. 181 Therefore, as
no-poaching agreements artificially affect three major facets of the labor
market (numerous firms competing to hire labor; wage-taking behavior; and
labor mobility), no-poaching agreements that do not serve some legitimate
purpose, for example, the effectuation of an M&A or a joint venture, violate
Section 1. 182 Consequently, courts can apply the per se rule to naked nopoaching agreements, which serve no purpose other than to disrupt labor
competition; no-poaching agreements’ harmful effects on labor competition
are apparent when analyzing their effects on a competitive labor market. 183
176. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343–45 (1982) (explaining
that the per se rule eliminates the need to perform a market analysis and defendants cannot offer
procompetitive benefits or business justifications); About the Division, supra note 21 (articulating
that the purpose of antitrust laws is “to protect economic freedom and opportunity by promoting
free and fair competition in the marketplace”).
177. See, e.g., Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 654 (2d Cir. 1957) (mentioning the
no-poaching agreement restricted the employees’ freedom to move to other companies in the sales
industry).
178. See Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 8–9 (explaining how employers typically use
recruitment).
179. See id.
180. BORJAS, supra note 144, at 145; Disequilibrium, supra note 145.
181. BORJAS, supra note 144, at 145; Disequilibrium, supra note 145.
182. See, e.g., Union Circulation Co., 241 F.2d at 657; Gallant, supra note 80; Wage
Determination in Perfectly Competitive Labour Markets, supra note 140.
183. See, e.g., In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1122 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (recognizing that it is a “false assumption” to assume the rule of reason applies to all nopoaching agreements). While courts have not yet expressly held that naked no-poaching agreements
should be treated as per se, it is not necessary for them to do so. See id. The court stated:
Defendants’ argument relies on the false assumption that the Court should apply a rule
of reason analysis, but as the parties agree, . . . the Court need not decide now whether
per se or rule of reason analysis applies. Indeed, that decision is more appropriate on a
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have successfully pled a per se violation of the
Sherman Act for purposes of surviving a 12(b)(6) motion, . . . and therefore no market
analysis is required at this time.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Plaintiff’s Motion for Application, supra note 18.
The per se rule does not condemn specific agreements based on their particular language
or details; it condemns entire classes of agreements based on their terms and economic
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Accordingly, the DOJ’s commitment to scrutinize naked no-poaching
agreements as criminal per se violations is entrenched in economics, which
is the root of antitrust principles.
B. NAKED NO-POACHING AGREEMENTS MIRROR CUSTOMER
ALLOCATION AGREEMENTS
Notwithstanding the support labor economics lends to the DOJ’s policy,
as previously stated, the touchstone for why it is logical for the DOJ to pursue
naked anti-poaching agreements criminally is two-fold. Thus, now that we
have deduced the anticompetitive effects of naked no-poaching agreements
based solely on the fundamentals of labor economics, we can now delve into
the second dimension supporting the DOJ’s policy. This Section explains
how established antitrust laws support the DOJ’s policy to pursue naked nopoaching agreements criminally.
Recall from Part II that customer allocation agreements, a form of market
allocation, are agreements between competitors to allocate customers among
themselves. 184 Let us use the customer allocation agreement in United States
v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co. 185 for illustrative purposes. There, the case
concerned an agreement among uniform and industrial clothing rental
companies in Florida not to solicit each other’s customers and to discourage
customers from switching to other rental companies. 186 Further, when the
companies’ discouragement was unsuccessful, managers had meetings which
involved exchanging customer accounts so that customers were shared
among each company equally. 187 The court held that the agreement was a per
se violation because the agreement restricted free choice among customers
and artificially stabilized prices. 188
No-poaching agreements operate similarly to customer allocation
agreements. 189 Again, no-poaching agreements practically say, “I won’t
recruit your employees if you don’t recruit mine,” and “If we hire employee

effects. . . . (But sometimes the reasonableness judgment can be generalized for a class
of behavior or for a class of claimed defenses.) Economic analysis, combined with stare
decisis, drives the inquiry. ([P]er se rule applies where serious pernicious effects are
likely to result from most of its concrete manifestations, and social benefits are likely to
be absent or small or readily achievable in other ways).
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
184. See supra Part II, Section D (citing various cases involving customer allocation agreements,
including United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1090 (5th Cir. 1978)).
185. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d at 1081.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1082.
189. Compare id. at 1081 (where the companies agreed to actively ensure that customers stayed
with their current supplier), with Order Denying Approval of Settlements, supra note 12 (where the
companies agreed not to recruit or seek out each other’s employees so that employees remain with
their current employer).
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Q first, employee Q is ours forever.” 190 Agreements of this nature are similar
to customer allocation agreements because customer allocation agreements
practically say, “These were my customers first, so they will be my customers
forever.” 191 Summarily, both no-poaching agreements and allocation
agreements possess territorial and entitlement components; “these customers
or these employees are mine, you can’t have them, so let’s agree not to
compete for them.” 192
Both no-poaching agreements and customer allocation agreements have
similar anticompetitive effects in markets.193 As this Article proves in the
labor market analysis above, agreements between employers not to recruit or
compete for each other’s employees restrict employee mobility, which
infringes on employees’ freedom of choice, and artificially interfere with
wage-taking behavior, which results in wage-fixing. 194 To demonstrate, let
us compare labor market competition disruptions caused by no-poaching
agreements to market competition disruptions caused by customer allocation
agreements.
First, customer allocation can result in higher prices for customers
because they tend to eliminate price competition; this effect is similar to nopoaching agreements because the elimination of competition among
employers can result in low wages for employees. 195Second, just as customer
allocation agreements demote consumers’ freedom of choice and decrease
options in products because they pre-select which consumers will have access
to certain products in the market, no-poaching agreements restrict
employees’ freedom of movement and freedom of choice to work wherever
such employees desire within labor markets. 196 Thus, no-poaching
190. See Moscarini & Postel-Vinay, supra note 172; see also Grimmer, supra note 15 (“Like an
(illegal) agreement among competitors to divide sales territories, a naked agreement among
competitors for labor simply to not hire each other’s employees is likely per se illegal (in essence,
they both entail ‘you keep what’s yours, I keep what’s mine’).”). The same principle applies to
market allocation agreements that divide markets by customers (namely, customer allocation
agreements). See id.
191. See Grimmer, supra note 15 (mentioning the entitlement nature of no-poaching agreements
and market allocation agreements).
192. See United States v. Consol. Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 574–75 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding
businesses agreeing not to compete for “old customers” was illegal even though they competed for
new customers). The companies’ agreement indicated their belief that they were entitled to
customers they had already gained. Id.
193. See supra Part V, Section A (analyzing the anticompetitive effects of no-poaching
agreements).
194. See supra Part V, Section A.
195. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1293 (S.D. Fla.
2005) (explaining that customer allocation agreements are per se illegal because they have the
“tendency to diminish output and raise prices”).
196. See, e.g., COLLIN & RIDINGS, supra note 84 (“Under the antitrust laws, it is unlawful for
horizontal competitors to divide up territories so customers have no choice but to purchase from the
seller that has rights in their territory.”); Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 655 (2d Cir.
1957) (mentioning that the no-poaching agreement restricted the employees’ freedom to move to
other companies in the sales industry).
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agreements closely mirror customer allocation agreements because they have
the same territorial nature as customer allocation agreements and have similar
anticompetitive effects on their relevant markets. 197 Because naked nopoaching agreements mirror customer allocation agreements so closely, they
are, in essence, employee allocation agreements, and therefore, should be
treated as per se violations of Section 1. 198 Hence, well-established antitrust
laws support the DOJ’s criminal pursuit of naked no-poaching agreements.
Further, as stated above, labor economics substantiates the policy. Therefore,
proof that the DOJ’s policy is both logical and prudent is two-fold.
CONCLUSION
When it comes to per se violations, it makes no difference whether naked,
horizontal agreements negatively affect labor markets or sales markets. Basic
labor economics and antitrust principles make clear that, absent a legitimate
reason, no player—whether an employer or employee—in the labor market
should have the power to alter the labor market in any given industry. Nopoaching agreements entered into by employers create this power, as they
affect the market through artificial means. As labor economics dictates,
employers and their human resource professionals should not have the ability
to artificially alter the labor market in any industry, even if the market is
already imperfect. Imperfections in the labor market are inevitable, but such
imperfections should only result from the natural flow of the economy—not
from artificial manipulation.
Moreover, the very existence of antitrust law is to promote competition
in markets, so that consumers have choices and receive price competition
benefits. Similarly, when antitrust law is applied to labor markets, the goal is
to promote freedom of choice among employees and afford employees the
benefit of wage competition. Naked no-poaching agreements have clear anticompetitive effects on labor markets because they: (1) restrict competition
among employers for specific types of labor, (2) restrict mobility among
employees, and (3) disrupt wage-taking behavior (resulting in wage-fixing).
This artificial disruption of competition is exactly the type of apparent
harmful effect that antitrust law has condemned as a per se violation under
Section 1. Therefore, the DOJ’s decision to criminally prosecute corporations
and corporate officials for naked no-poaching agreements is strongly
supported by more than a century of antitrust law and criminal prosecution
policy. If sales departments must refrain from entering horizontal, naked
197. See supra Part V, Sections A–B (analyzing how no-poaching agreements are similar to
customer allocation agreements).
198. See United States v. Consol. Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 574–75 (2d Cir. 1961) (making
clear customer allocations are no different from any other market allocation agreement and should
be treated as per se violations); see also supra Part V, Sections A–B (analyzing how no-poaching
agreements are similar to customer allocation agreements).
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agreements that affect sales and price competition (like market allocation
agreements), then human resources departments must refrain from entering
horizontal, naked agreements that affect labor and wage competition.
Recall from Part I of this Article that the application of the per se rule
would not allow employers to offer business justifications for their behavior,
no matter how clever. Further, in Part II, this Article explained that courts
apply the rule of reason to vertical restraints and typically apply the per se
rule to horizontal restraints. As noted, one analogy to a vertical restraint in
the labor force are non-compete agreements. They are vertical because the
employee and the employer enter an agreement at different market levels. On
the other hand, no-poaching agreements are between employers at the same
market level. Hence, it is no surprise that the DOJ intends to pursue naked
no-poaching agreements under the per se rule. Employers and their human
resource professionals should simply make efforts to ensure that their reasons
for entering no-poaching agreements are to further some legitimate business
purpose, and they should narrowly tailor any such agreements.

